Despite the existence of two vast literatures, very little is known about the potential di¤erences or interactions between search and switching costs. This paper demonstrates the bene…ts of examining the two frictions in unison. First, the paper shows how subtle distinctions between the two costs can provide important di¤erences in their e¤ects upon consumer behaviour and market prices. In many cases, policymakers may prefer to reduce search costs rather than switching costs. Second, the paper illustrates a simple methodology for estimating the magnitude of both costs while demonstrating the potential bias that can arise from a single-cost approach.
Introduction
In many markets, from bank accounts or mortgages to washing powder or computer software, consumers' choices are constrained by di¤erent forms of market friction.
Consumers' ability to change suppliers is often restricted by both the costs of collecting information about alternative options and the costs of organising or adjusting to an actual changeover. Despite this, the two vast literatures on search costs and switching Contact details: c.m.wilson@lboro.ac.uk costs have remained largely independent of each other 1 . Indeed, very little is known about the potential di¤erences or interactions between the costs and worse, the two frictions are often referred to synonymously. This paper demonstrates the bene…ts of examining the e¤ects of search and switching costs in unison. It hopes to enable better policy in two ways. First, the paper shows how subtle distinctions between the two costs can provide important di¤erences in their e¤ects upon consumer behaviour and market prices. Second, the paper illustrates a simple methodology for estimating the magnitude of both costs while demonstrating the potential bias that can arise from a single-cost approach. Farrell and Klemperer (2007) suggest 'a consumer faces a switching cost between sellers when an investment speci…c to his current seller must be duplicated for a new seller'. Examples include the costs from lost compatibility, lost loyalty bene…ts and the cost of rearranging transactions. While search costs may appear consistent with the last of these examples, it seems natural to make four major distinctions.
Unlike switching costs, search costs cannot be incurred by a fully informed consumer (Distinction 1), search costs may be incurred more than once by searching across multiple …rms (Distinction 2), search costs may be incurred without then necessarily choosing to switch suppliers (Distinction 3), and in a dynamic context, search costs may be incurred before any initial market purchase (Distinction 4) . For the purposes of this paper therefore, the two costs are de…ned as follows. While these distinctions and de…nitions could be viewed as arbitrary, care is later taken to demonstrate the importance of each distinction on the market equilibrium. De…nition 1. Search costs are the costs incurred by a consumer in identifying a …rm's or set of …rms' product and price o¤erings, regardless of whether the consumer then buys the product from the searched …rm(s) or not. De…nition 2. Switching costs are the costs incurred by a consumer in changing suppliers that do not act to improve the consumer's information.
Section 3 introduces the model. Within a standard di¤erentiated products framework (Perlo¤ and Salop 1985) , it presents a static game of a mature market where all consumers must incur both search and switching costs in order to move away from their existing supplier 2 . Section 4 starts the analysis by o¤ering an original characterisation of a consumer's optimal 'search to switch' strategy, describing how extensively a consumer should search a market and to which …rm, if any, the consumer should switch. By then endogenising the equilibrium price, Section 5 provides a uni…ed model of search and switching costs where the results of standard 'singlecost' models, such as Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) , can be illustrated as special cases. Section 6 examines the comparative statics. The mechanisms by which the two costs a¤ect competition have some important di¤erences. Search costs weaken the incentive for …rms to cut prices by reducing the willingness of consumers to start searching and by decreasing the extensiveness of any search activity across multiple …rms. Switching costs also deter initial search activity but they do not a¤ect the extensiveness of any search because they cannot be incurred across multiple …rms (Distinction 2). However, because switching costs can still be incurred by fully informed consumers, (Distinction 1), they also enhance the loyalty of consumers that have searched the entire market. As a result, parameters can be selected such that either cost can have the larger marginal impact on equilibrium prices. Nevertheless, the paper shows that in many cases, search costs have the more powerful e¤ect on market power. This follows from Distinction 3 which ensures that search costs have the stronger e¤ect in deterring initial search activity. When evaluating whether to start searching, consumers place less weight on switching costs because, unlike search costs, they are incurred only with the probability of …nding an attractive alternative.
Within the context of the model therefore, an authority may often wish to reduce search costs by improving consumers' access to information, rather than taking actions to regulate or ease consumers' costs of switching 3 .
In line with reality, the model o¤ers an attractive description of market interaction where some consumers choose not to search, some consumers choose to engage in costly search and costly switching, and some consumers select to partake in costly search but then refrain from switching 4 . Section 7 uses this feature with data from a consumer survey to recover some quick 'back of the envelope' measures for both search and switching costs within eight di¤erent UK markets. In contrast to the approach taken by previous empirical studies that provide rich and general structural estimates of the actual value of either search costs or switching costs 5 , the paper emphasises the potential importance of accounting for both frictions. Indeed, it is shown that by incorrectly attributing all imperfections to only one cost, a 'single-cost' methodology can exhibit an upward bias.
Previous Literature
This section reviews the limited number of previous papers that have analysed both frictions in unison. Compared to previous theoretical work, our model is substantially 3 The paper also notes a result that appears to have been overlooked within the switching cost literature. Independent of the existence of search costs, the equilibrium price can be independent of the level of switching costs for certain parameters in the case of duopoly. While recent dynamic models have stressed the possibility that the incentives generated by switching costs can be procompetitive (Doganoglu 2005 costs have an equivalent e¤ect. Closest to this paper, is the theoretical section of Knittel (1997) . As a foundation for an empirical analysis into the US telephone industry, he provides an initial description of consumers' optimal behaviour for any level of search and switching costs. We build on this to o¤er a full characterisation of Using a di¤erent mechanism to the current paper and not allowing for the possibility that consumers may face both costs, they develop a model capable of identifying whether consumers' television viewing behaviour is more consistent with the existence of search or switching costs. They show the former is true for 71% of consumers, and estimate the average search cost to be relatively larger than the average switching cost 6 . 6 Speci…cally, they identify the costs by showing that a consumer who is constrained by switching costs will be equally likely to switch following a reduction in the quality of the current product choice relative to an equivalent increase in the quality of an alternative product, whereas a reduction in the quality of the current choice will produce an asymmetrically larger e¤ect in a consumer constrained by search costs.
Model
The model builds on Perlo¤ and Salop's (1985) di¤erentiated products framework where each consumer places an idiosyncratic 'match value' on the product of each …rm and where consumers seek to purchase from the …rm that best suits her tastes.
Although qualitatively similar results can be demonstrated within a 'price-search' model, this framework is chosen because it can better capture the full e¤ects of Distinction 1.
Formally, let there be n 2 …rms that each sell a single good with zero production costs. A unit mass of consumers have a zero outside option and each possess a unit demand for the market good. Let consumer m gain a utility, u mi = " mi p i ; from choosing to buy from …rm i at a price p i ; where the 'match value', " mi ; is an independent draw from a distribution G(") with positive density g(") on ["; "], where " > ". the consumer should then switch.
Searching to Switch
To begin the analysis, this section derives the optimal search to switch strategy for a given consumer, under the assumption that the price of the consumer's local …rm is p i and that the price of all non-local …rms is p : It suggests that the optimal strategy can be simpli…ed to the use of two reservation utilities: Lemma 1. Given a search cost; c; and switching cost, s; the optimal search to switch strategy consists of the following.
Step 1: If maxf0; " i p i g + p b
x s; buy from …rm i without search. Otherwise search any unsearched …rm.
Step 2: Keep searching until some …rm k is found such that " k b
x. Stop searching and switch to …rm k.
Step 3: If no such …rm is found amongst all the alternatives, trade with the …rm
and b
x equals " otherwise.
To derive the optimal strategy, one could formally cast the problem as a dynamic programming decision with …nite options, where any single initial or latter search de-cision should be evaluated by its payo¤s conditional on behaving optimally thereafter.
However, as standard search results demonstrate, such problems can be solved equivalently by considering the myopic bene…ts of searching a single …rm, disregarding its e¤ects on future decisions (e.g. Kohn and Shavell 1974) .
Step 1 of the optimal strategy provides a rule for deciding whether to initiate search beyond the local …rm. Using the above logic, this reduces to a comparison of the bene…ts from not searching, maxf0; " i p i g, with the expected bene…ts of making a single search where, for a cost of c, a new surplus o¤er of (" j p s) can be discovered.
Such an o¤er will only improve upon the local o¤er i¤ " j > maxf0; " i p i g + p + s.
For convenience denote x 1 maxf0; " i p i g+p +s: The consumer will be indi¤erent
Search will then be optimal whenever x 1 maxf0;
x 1 can be set equal to " + s without loss as then search will never be optimal.
After deciding to initiate search and on …nding a new o¤er, (" j p s); the consumer must decide when to stop searching in Step 2. If (" j p s) maxf0; " i p i g the consumer should clearly continue searching. However, on …nding a potentially attractive o¤er, the bene…ts of terminating search immediately must be compared to making an additional search, where, for a further cost of c, a further o¤er of (" k p s)
will improve upon the current o¤er only if " k > " j . By denoting x 2 " j ; indi¤erence
If no solution exists within ["; "], search will not be optimal and b
x 2 can be de…ned equal to " without loss 8 .
Finally, to complete the derivation, Step 3 follows trivially for the scenario in which the consumer has searched and initially rejected all the alternatives. Here, the 8 As the de…nitions for b x1 and b x2 coincide, Lemma 1 simply re-labels them both as b x:
consumer is then free to trade with the …rm o¤ering the best market deal (net of switching costs), provided such a deal is preferred to the outside option of zero.
Equilibrium
The paper now considers the …rms' pricing decisions. For tractability, attention is focussed on the uniform distribution; G(") = (" ")=(" ") and g(") = 1=(" "):
First, it is clear that the …rms are able to sustain the monopoly price 9 , p m = maxf"=2; "g; if no consumers wish to search in equilibrium, maxf"; p m g b
x s:
Consequently, the symmetric equilibrium price, p ; is now found under the assumptions that i) some positive fraction of consumers do search in equilibrium, b x s > maxf"; p g, and ii) s; c 0 such that b
x ": Given that the price of all other …rms is p ; and using the terminology of Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2007), …rm i's residual demand, D i (p i ; p ); can be composed into the sum of fresh and return demand, 
i receives a demand from non-local consumers who choose to visit during their search process and …nd it optimal to stop and buy. The number of visits can be expressed by
k and the probability of stopping at …rm i, conditional on visiting, equals Pr(" i > b x+p i p ).
Firm i's share of return demand, (3), stems from consumers within Step 3 of the optimal strategy, who have searched the entire market without …nding a match worth stopping for, but then realise that …rm i o¤ers them the best deal. Its derivation is more complicated and is contained within the appendix.
The symmetric equilibrium price can be found from the …rst order condition, p =
can be derived by di¤erentiating the sum of (2) and (3), and evaluating at p i = p in order to obtain (5), where I(p ") = 1 i¤ p " and zero otherwise: An expression for the equilibrium price is then presented in (6) 10 .
1 0 In the appendix, equilibrium existence is demonstrated for the case of large n. For smaller n; we implicitly assume that there no pro…table deviations away from the price implied by the …rst order condition. Such an assumption is common in models of friction (e.g. Wolinksy 1986, 
The expression for the equilibrium price breaks down into two possible cases, i) p " or ii) p > ". In the …rst case, labelled as market coverage, all consumers buy in equilibrium such that each …rm's demand in equilibrium, (4), collapses to (1=n) and the equilibrium price, p C ; reduces to (7) . Note that as market frictions tend to zero, such that b
x and b x s tend to ", the equilibrium price converges to (" ")=n: This price corresponds to that found in Perlo¤ and Salop (1985) and re ‡ects the market power that derives purely from product di¤erentiation. Consequently, a necessary condition for the existence of the market coverage case requires (" ")=n ": As formalised in the next section, an increase in friction, decreases b x s and increases the equilibrium price. As the price reaches ", either further increases in friction have no e¤ect on the equilibrium price as p m maxf"=2; "g = " if " "=2; or, if " < "=2; p increases beyond " and the second case of non-market coverage becomes active.
In the case of non-market coverage, the equilibrium price excludes some consumers such that, in accordance with intuition, the expression for each …rm's equilibrium demand, (4), reduces to (1=n)(1 (Pr(" < p ) Pr(" < p + s) n 1 )): An explicit expression for the equilibrium price, p N C ; is hard to obtain, but the original expression for the equilibrium price collapses to (8) . Note that as b x s ! p N C ; such that all consumers refrain from searching; the equilibrium price converges to p m = "=2:
Finally, before examining the comparative statics in more detail, it is worth considering some special cases. If one sets switching costs to zero, the price derived in (6) o¤ers an original uni…cation of the equilibrium prices found in the search models of Anderson and Renault (1999) and Wolinksy (1986) (which assume market coverage and non-market coverage, respectively). Second, by setting search costs to zero, such that b x = "; the model collapses to a static analysis of switching costs which shares some similar features to the framework used in the in…nite horizon (duopoly) models of Doganoglu (2005) and Cabral (2008) 11 .
Comparative Statics
In this section, some comparative statics are examined, while paying particular attention to the relative mechanisms by which changes in the level of search and switching costs a¤ect competition. If the monopoly price can already be sustained, increases in either cost will have no e¤ect. To avoid this case, the assumption that some consumers search in equilibrium is maintained throughout. Further, as much of the intuition can be understood in the more tractable and simpler case of market coverage, we focus on that case …rst, before discussing the additional e¤ects within the non-market coverage case. All omitted proofs are contained in the appendix.
Market Coverage.
To aid later understanding, Proposition 1 notes that increases in the number of competitors reduces the equilibrium price, (7) . Intuitively, increases in n generate two e¤ects on the price sensitivity of each …rm's demand.
Fresh demand becomes more price sensitive due to a decrease in each …rm's share of local consumers (1=n) and an increase in the number of visits from the relatively more price sensitive non-local consumers. Return demand becomes more price sensitive as such consumers now have a larger number of options to choose from.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium price is decreasing in the number of …rms, n, for any n 2; provided there is some search in equilibrium, b x s > ":
To now examine the comparative statics of either search or switching costs, notice that in the case of market coverage, one need only examine the e¤ect on the denominator, D 0 i (p C ; p C ); as the size of the market in the numerator is left unchanged at unity by assumption. Consider …rst the e¤ects of an increase in search costs, by writing the derivative of (1=p C ) with respect to c as shown below. Proposition 2 then follows, using the fact that @b x=@c = (" ")=(" b
x):
Proposition 2. The equilibrium price is increasing in the level of search costs, c, for any n 2; provided there is some search in equilibrium, b x s > ":
The equilibrium price is increasing in the level of search costs. Of more interest, are the mechanisms through which this occurs. Through inspection of (9), one can observe the existence of two mechanisms that both act to reduce the potential increase …rm i's non-local demand that could be generated from a reduction in its price.
First, holding the extensiveness of consumers' search activity beyond the …rst search constant (via b x), a growth in search costs discourages non-local consumers from engaging in any initial search activity (via a reduction in b x s). Second, conditional on a consumer beginning search, an increase in search costs also reduces the extensiveness of any search via a reduction in b
x Now consider an increase in the level of switching costs by inspection of (10). Proposition 3 then follows as @(b x s)=@s = 1:
Proposition 3. The equilibrium price is increasing in the level of switching costs, s, for any n 2, provided there is some search in equilibrium, b x s > ":
The equilibrium price is also increasing in the level of switching costs, but the mechanisms by which this occur have some di¤erences to those observed following an increase in search costs. to switching costs on deterring initial search activity. Both costs enhance inertia, 1 2 Note that this e¤ect would not be captured within a framework that does not permit the existence of return demand, as in many price-search models.
but importantly, note that this expression is negative such that search costs have the larger e¤ect, with @G(b x s)=@c @G(b x s)=@s = (b x ")=(" b x)(" ") < 0: This di¤erence stems from the assumption that search costs may be incurred without necessarily choosing to switch (Distinction 3). In evaluating the expected bene…ts from beginning search, the consumer gives a greater weight to search costs as she expects to incur them with certainty, while only expecting to incur switching costs with the lesser probability of …nding a worthwhile alternative. The inability of consumers to condition the payment of search costs on the exact value of any non-local o¤er makes them more powerful in deterring initial search.
In Proposition 4. When the number of …rms is small, the marginal e¤ects of the two costs on the equilibrium price, dp C =dc and dp C =ds; cannot be consistently ranked in order of magnitude. However, there exists n such that the marginal e¤ect from an increase in search costs is always larger when n > n ; for all s and c, provided there is some search in equilibrium, b x s > "; and if search costs are positive, b x < ":
Far from having equivalent e¤ects, the mechanisms by which search and switching costs a¤ect the market equilibrium are su¢ciently di¤erent that the two costs can have signi…cantly di¤erent marginal e¤ects on the equilibrium price. When the number of …rms is small, either cost can have the larger impact. However, when the number of …rms is larger than some threshold, n ; search costs have a consistently larger impact on market power. To understand why, note that from Proposition 1, increases in the number of competitors reduce the price sensitivity of fresh demand by increasing its composition towards visiting consumers from rival …rms. Consequently, increases in either friction that deter such visits then have a larger impact on raising prices when the number of …rms is larger. Further note from Proposition 1, that increases in the number of …rms also reduce the price sensitivity of return demand, such that the loyalty-inducing e¤ects of switching costs on such consumers also decline. Hence, for su¢ciently large n; these changes mute the impact of Distinction 1 and allow the e¤ects of search costs to dominate, through Distinctions 2 and 3. Proposition 4 can o¤er no general characterisation of the threshold number of …rms, but some initial simulations suggest that n can often be as low as four 13 .
Without Market
Coverage. In addition to the previous e¤ects, a further e¤ect of switching costs exists if not all consumers purchase in equilibrium. Indeed, as switching costs rise, a consumer is less likely to …nd a deal worth more than his outside option of zero and each …rm's demand in equilibrium shrinks, creating a downward pressure on the equilibrium price, p = D i (p ; p )=D 0 i (p ; p ): Once this extra mechanism is taken into account, the e¤ects of the two forms of frictions can be consistently ranked, as suggested in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. In the case of non-market coverage, the e¤ect on price following an increase in search costs always exceeds the e¤ect on price following an equivalent increase in switching costs, dp N C =dc > dp N C =ds; provided there is some search in equilibrium, b
x s > p N C ; and search costs are positive, b
x < ":
Finally, an extra result is noted that appears to have been overlooked within the switching cost literature. As a special case when n = 2 and " = 0; the equilibrium price can be rewritten as p =(" 2 p 2 ) = 1=(" + b x). Proposition 6 follows. 
Data Application
As discussed in the introduction, previous empirical studies have focussed on providing rich and general structural estimates of the actual value of either switching costs or search costs. Instead, this section shows how some restrictions from the consumers' optimal search to switch strategy can be used with consumer survey data to quickly recover a set of 'back of the envelope' measures for both search and switching costs.
The importance of considering both forms of friction simultaneously is demonstrated by showing how a 'single-cost' methodology can exhibit an upward bias.
To proceed, the results of Lemma 1 are used to select two restrictions on consumers' observable search and switching behaviour. These are then solved simultaneously to recover the two measures. Speci…cally, for any equilibrium price, for any number of …rms greater or equal to two, and regardless of the market coverage assumption, the model suggests the following 14 . First, the proportion of consumers who choose not to search beyond their local …rm, a, should equal 1 G(x s). From before, it follows that increases in either cost deter initial search activity, but search costs have the larger e¤ect, da=dc > da=ds > 0. Second, the proportion of consumers who choose to search and then switch after only one search, b, should equal, G(x s)(1 G(x)). One can observe that increases in switching costs decrease b
by reducing initial search activity, while higher search costs generate an ambiguous e¤ect by deterring initial search and reducing the extensiveness of any search. Simultaneously solving these two restrictions and using the de…nition b x = " p 2c(" ");
o¤ers measures for both costs, scaled by the extent of product di¤erentiation as shown below in (11) .
Had the existence of switching costs been ignored under a 'single-cost' approach, an estimate of search costs could have been recovered from a restriction on the proportion of non-searchers alone. By setting s = 0, the model would suggest a = 1 G(x)
yielding an estimate, (12) . By attributing all the observed inertia to search costs alone, this method can generate estimates of search costs that exhibit an upward bias. Indeed, it is easy to show that the single-cost estimate is equal to, or larger than, that found under the two-cost methodology
These measures are now calculated for eight di¤erent markets from the UK, using responses from the CCP survey as detailed in Chang and Waddams (2008) . From a potential 2027 consumers, those who were household decision makers and aware of the possibility of choice in the relevant market were asked a series of questions about their search and switching behaviour. Data on a and b is obtained from two questions: whether or not the consumer had searched for alternative suppliers in the past three years and if they had switched in the past three years, how many suppliers the consumer had searched beforehand. The estimated results are displayed in Table   1 . Second, within the data, the bias from neglecting switching costs is extremely large due to the fact that switching costs appear to be very important within the surveyed markets. Indeed, switching costs are estimated to be large relative to i) search costs and ii) the range of match values, (" "): Comparison i) derives from the low proportion of switching consumers that were observed to make only one search. This indicates that search costs were low such that consumers chose to conduct more extensive searches before switching. Despite this, the observation that many consumers refrained from any search activity suggests switching costs were large relative to the potential bene…ts from improving their match value, which leads to comparison ii).
Finally, it must be stressed that the exact values of these estimates should be treated with caution due to the simplifying assumptions of the underlying model. It is hoped that further research can build upon this method of identi…cation in order to provide a more general estimation procedure in the future. Some speci…c directions are suggested below.
Conclusions
To help policymakers better understand and measure market frictions, this paper has o¤ered a uni…ed analysis of search and switching costs. The paper has identi…ed the mechanisms by which the two costs can generate di¤erent e¤ects on competition.
Largely due to the fact that search costs can be incurred without choosing to switch, it suggests that in many settings search costs may generate the larger anti-competitive e¤ect. The paper has also presented a method for identifying the relative magnitude of the two costs. The method can be readily implemented using survey data and demonstrates the potential bias that can arise if one accounts only for a single cost.
To provide further help for policy, it would be useful for future research to extend the paper's …ndings to allow for asymmetric …rms, more general product value distributions and heterogeneous consumers. It would also be of further interest to consider a dynamic model, although it is likely that this will only strengthen the …ndings.
Standard results suggest that the introduction of dynamic competition often erodes the impact of switching costs by inducing …rms to compete for the future pro…ts of new consumers that are yet to be locked-in. However, Distinction 4 implies that no such e¤ect may be present in the context of search costs because it is common for them to exist both pre-and post-purchase. Search costs are a pervasive, persistent and powerful impediment to competition. Their study remains a key area for ongoing research.
Appendix:
Derivation of Return Demand, Equation (3).
The …rst term in (3) refers to …rm i's (1=n) own local consumers. They choose to search the entire market without choosing to stop but then buy from …rm i with the probability that i)
As ii) is non-binding, this probability can be expressed by R b
x s+p i p maxf";p i g G(" p i + p + s) n 1 g(")d" or equivalently, R b
x maxf";p i g+p p i +s G(") n 1 g(")d": Now consider the second term in (3). A consumer from …rm j 6 = i chooses to search the entire market without choosing to stop before Proposition 1: The equilibrium price is decreasing in the number of …rms, n, for any n 2; provided there is some search in equilibrium, b
x s > ":
Proof. Using, P n 2 k=0 G(b x) k = (1 G(b x) n 1 )=(1 G(b x)); d(1=p C )=dn = (" ") 1 [(G(x s)G(x) n 1 ln G(x))=(1 G(x)) + (s=(" ")) n 1 ln(s=(" "))] > 0; for n 2 when b
x " and s < " " as ensured when b x s > ":
Proposition 2: The equilibrium price is increasing in the level of search costs, c, for any n 2; provided there is some search in equilibrium, b x s > ":
Proof. Expanding (9) yields (" ") 2 (@b x=@c)[ P n 2 k=0 G(b x) k +G(b x s) P n 2 k=0 kG(b x) k 1 ], which given @b x=@c = (" ")=(" x); is negative for all n 2 when b
Proposition 3: The equilibrium price is increasing in the level of switching costs, s, for any n 2, provided there is some search in equilibrium, b x s > ":
Proof. Expanding (10) yields (" ") 2 (@(b x s)=@s)[ P n 2 k=0 G(b x) k + (n 1)(s=(" ")) n 2 ]; which given @(b x s)=@s = 1; is negative for all n 2 when b
Proposition 4: When the number of …rms is small, the marginal e¤ects of the two costs on the equilibrium price, dp C =dc and dp C =ds; cannot be consistently ranked in order of magnitude. However, there exists n such that the marginal e¤ect from an increase in search costs is always larger when n > n ; for all s and c, provided there is some search in equilibrium, b x s > "; and if search costs are positive, b x < ":
Proof.
To prove the …rst claim, we need only show that there exists a range of parameters with low n where A > 0 such that dp C =dc < dp C =ds: As A is increasing in s; set s as large as possible within our assumptions, such that A(s ' b x ") = (" ") 2 [(n 1)G(b x) n 2 ((b x ")=(" b x)) P n 2 k=0 G(b x) k ]. It then follows that A(s ' b x "; n = 2) > 0 when b
x belongs to the non-empty interval, ["; ("+")=2): To prove the second claim, we show that for all relevant parameters, i) @A(s ' b x ")=@n < 0 and ii)
A(s ' b x ") < 0 when n ! 1: For i) note that @A(s ' b
x ")=@n can be expressed as This is increasing in b
x; yet negative for all n 2; even when b
x is set equal to the maximum value consistent with our assumption that c > 0; that is b x = " . Finally, for ii) note that A(s ' b x ") < 0 when n ! 1 for all b x 2 ("; "]:
Proposition 5: In the case of non-market coverage, the marginal e¤ect on price following an increase in search costs always exceeds that from an equivalent increase in switching costs, dp N C =dc > dp N C =ds; provided there is some search in equilibrium, b x s > p N C ; and search costs are positive, b
Proof.
Using (8), de…ne H = p N C (" ") 1 [1 + G(b x s) P n 2 k=0 G(b x) k )] 1 + G(p N C )G(p N C + s) = 0: From the implicit function theorem, it then follows that dp N C =dc > dp N C =ds if i) dH=dp N C > 0 and ii) dH=dc < dH=ds: Both are true, given (@(b x s)=@c @(b x s)=@s) = (b x ")=(" b
x) < 0 and our initial assumption, b x s > p N C > ":
